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Well-Known, or Not Well-Known? That is 
the Question. The Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property’s 
Article 6bis in the Context of American 
Trademark Law 
Ahmad Takouche*  
 
With an interconnected world, products and services can be 
exchanged instantaneously, and what people may have considered as 
foreign can now be within their grasp. This brings a multitude of legal 
questions, including how to protect the trademark rights of companies 
that may not yet have an extensive place in the American economy, but 
may soon. Article 6bis of the Paris Convention on the Protection of 
Industrial Property emphasizes that countries may refuse to register a 
trademark within their own borders if that trademark is one that is 
well-known in another country. The United States has agreed to that 
principle by adopting the Paris Convention and reaffirming the so-called 
“well-known marks” doctrine in subsequent treaties. But as of now, 
courts are split as to how to implement this idea into domestic law. 
This split can be resolved. Read together under the lens of a canon 
of construction that emphasizes the United States’ role in adhering to 
international law, three sections of the Lanham Act––the statutory 
scheme that provides for federal recognition of trademarks––imply that 
Article 6bis and the well-known marks doctrine do in fact have a role 
in domestic law. This Note presents this argument by first providing a 
short discussion of the relevant law and history, then arguing that despite 
certain shortcomings in the ability to implement the Paris Convention in 
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domestic law, there is still a way to read the well-known marks doctrine 
as being protected through the Lanham Act. 
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Despite the recent political debates regarding the issue of globalization, the 
world is clearly becoming more and more interconnected on a daily basis. People 
can travel more easily, access information within seconds, and even purchase goods 
and services across borders. Thus, the economies of each country on the globe can 
be dependent on the citizens of different states. This brings up a multitude of 
questions on a variety of issues, but one of the most important questions is the role 
trademarks play in this global economy. If one goes even deeper, there are 
thousands of questions that come up with this issue. 
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In this Note, I will focus on one aspect of trademark law: the well-known 
marks doctrine, as first explained in Article 6bis of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property (“Paris Convention”).1 This doctrine states that 
“[i]f a mark used only on products or services sold abroad is so famous that its 
reputation is known in the United States, then that mark should be legally 
recognized in the United States.”2 
This doctrine has been well-established in treaty law and has been reiterated 
in subsequent intellectual property treaties following the original draft of the Paris 
Convention.3 But there is a debate as to whether it is also established in the domestic 
law of the United States. The Ninth Circuit said it is, acknowledging the growing 
importance of products crossing borders. However, the Second Circuit refused to 
abide by this understanding, holding that established American trademark law did 
not invoke the doctrine in the plain meaning of its terms.4 
This issue has raised an eclectic range of questions. What is a well-known 
trademark? If a foreign company wants to sell its products or services in the United 
States, how can it protect its trademark within U.S. borders? Similarly, what happens 
when a foreign company infringes the well-known trade name or service mark of 
an American-based company in commerce within American borders or abroad? In 
that vein, how do the traditional methods of testing the strength of a trademark 
hold up in the new global economy? Can a foreign business enforce its trademark 
rights derived in a foreign country against a user in the United States? In either 
situation, would a court examining this question apply U.S. law, an international 
treaty, or both? American courts and legal scholars have debated these issues, but 
no pertinent, specific answers have come up.5 Simply, there is a lot of uncertainty 
about what to do to answer these questions. This was most evident when the Ninth 
Circuit and Second Circuit courts adopted completely opposite viewpoints on 
whether the well-known marks doctrine has a domestic effect, creating a circuit split 
that has yet to be resolved.6 
 
1. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as revised at 
Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 1648, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, 337 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
2. 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION,  
§ 29:4 (5th ed.). 
3. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement Canada-Mexico-United States, art. 1708, 
Dec. 8, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 605, 673; TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 320 (1999), 33 
I.L.M. 1197, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994) [hereinafter GATT TRIPS]. 
4. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 164 (2d Cir. 2007), certified question accepted, 8 
N.Y.3d 994 (2007), and certified question answered, 9 N.Y.3d 467 (2007) (holding that despite treaty 
obligations, the United States has not invoked the “well-known marks” doctrine in federal law); Grupo 
Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the doctrine does 
exist in federal law as an “exception to the territoriality principle”). 
5. See cases cited supra note 4; see also sources cited infra notes 15, 19. 
6. See cases cited supra note 4. 
First to Printer_Takouche (Do Not Delete) 1/28/2019  9:07 AM 
498 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:495 
Because the global marketplace is ever-changing, parties litigating trademark 
issues in federal courts are increasingly advocating for the recognition and 
application of exceptions to the traditional principle of U.S. trademark law.7 Under 
this traditional principle, a party acquires rights only through actual use of a 
trademark in the United States.8 But international law––generally and as applied to 
trademark rights––has long recognized a principle of territoriality localizing such 
property rights, which may not exactly require “use” as a prerequisite for trademark 
protection.9 
In recognizing the greater role trademarks and other forms of intellectual 
property play in the global economy, many nations of the world adopted the Paris 
Convention in 1883.10 It has since been revised numerous times, with the most 
recent version coming as the Stockholm Act, adopted in 1967.11 Today, there are 
195 States Parties to the Stockholm Act.12 
The purpose of the Article 6bis, and subsequently, the well-known marks 
doctrine, is to avoid the registration and use of a trademark, liable to create confusion 
with another mark already well-known in the country of such registration or use, although 
the latter well-known mark is not, or not yet, protected in that country by a 
registration which would normally prevent the registration or use of the conflicting 
mark.13 In today’s interconnected globe and economy, foreign marks can accrue a 
well-known distinction much more easily. For instance, many scholars have 
evaluated the role the Internet plays in the global economy14 and how trademark 
law may be affected by it. Additionally, easier global travel lets people more easily 
find marks from other countries, and foreign companies can now try and make their 
 
7. See cases cited supra note 4. 
8. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 19:1 (citing Grand Canyon West Ranch, L.L.C. v. Hualapai 
Tribe, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 1696 (TTAB 2006) (“It is clear that an applicant cannot obtain a registration under 
Section 1 of the Trademark Act for goods or services upon which it has not used the mark.”)). 
9. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:1. 
10. WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/ActResults.jsp?act_id=31 [https://perma.cc/2RLE-NBWQ] ( last visited Jan. 25, 2019). 
11. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:22. 
12. WIPO-Administered Treaties, supra note 10. 
13. G.H.C. BODENHUASEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR 
THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 90 (1968), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/
intproperty/611/wipo_pub_611.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4G9-RN3S]. 
14. Joshua Clowers, On International Trademark and the Internet: The Lanham Act’s Long Arms, 
13, RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2006) (stating that “[t]he Internet’s influence has brought the necessity for 
comprehensive international standards for trademark protection to a critical point, and regardless  
of which direction we go from here, the result must reflect the reality of our globalized commercial 
society. Any proposed solution that neglects to adequately address this reality is a failure on its face and 
will only serve to further complicate the issue.”); see also Sheldon W. Halpern, A High Likelihood  
of Confusion: Wal-Mart, TrafFix, Moseley, and Dastar—The Supreme Court’s New Jurisprudence, 61  
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 237, 239 (2005) (arguing that “the growing international and transnational 
nature of commerce, the spread of digital technology, and the ubiquity of the Internet, which together 
have provided a fertile ground for new trademark battles, have accompanied a broad legislative and 
judicial expansion of fundamental trademark concepts.”); Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global 
Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 695 (1998). 
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marks well-known through online advertising. But there must be more discussion 
as to the role Article 6bis plays in the domestic context and how to resolve the circuit 
split. 
Historically, there has been an inconsistent application of the well-known 
marks doctrine by the United States as between domestic and foreign companies. 
U.S. companies, quite frankly, are not shy about using the doctrine to protect their 
well-known trademarks. Indeed, there have been numerous instances where 
American companies used the well-known marks doctrine to protect their 
respective famous trademarks across the globe. One example is that of the 
ubiquitous American coffee powerhouse Starbucks. Before 2005, the well-known 
STARBUCKS trademark had not been used on coffee shops in Russia. That year, 
a Russian entrepreneur registered the STARBUCKS coffee trademark and logo.  
He then offered to sell the Russian rights to the U.S. owner of the mark for 
$600,000. But Russian authorities ruled that the Russian registration was “pirated” 
and cancelled it at the behest of the U.S. owner.15 Similarly, in 2014, the U.S. maker 
of Tesla electric vehicles was about to introduce its products to China. However, 
before it could do so, the company found that a Chinese person had in 2006 
registered, without use, the TESLA mark for automobiles in China. This was three 
years after Tesla’s first use in 2003 in the United States. Using the well-known marks 
doctrine, the U.S. company was successful in having the Chinese authorities 
invalidate the registration.16  
These are some of the numerous instances in which American companies have 
been able to cancel the registration of their well-known marks by a non-affiliated 
foreign party. However, the United States does not always afford the same 
protection to foreign companies. Simply put, “the United States cannot expect other 
nations to protect famous American trademarks if United States courts decline to 
afford reciprocal protection to famous foreign marks.”17 The U.S. is a signatory to 
numerous intellectual property treaties that provide protection to well-known 
 
15. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:61 (citing Starbucks Wins Trademark Battle in Russia, 
MOSNEWS (Nov. 17, 2005), http://www.mosnews.com/money/2005/11/17/starbucks.shtml 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20060324025107/http://www.mosnews.com/money/2005/11/17/ 
starbucks.shtml]); Susan J. Keri, Starbucks Trademark Victory in Russia, INT’L TRADEMARK  
ASSOC. (Mar. 15, 2006), https://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/StarbucksTrademarkVictory 
inRussia.aspx [https://perma.cc/P3VB-X4DE]. 
16. Even though Tesla ended up invalidating the Chinese registration, it was sued for 
infringement by the Chinese registrant while proceedings were pending. To clear up the matter, Tesla 
had to enter into a settlement with the (at the time) Chinese trademark holder. Samuel Shen &  
Norihiko Shirouzu, Tesla Resolves Trademark Dispute in China, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2014, 8:31 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tesla-motors-china-idUSKBN0G606420140806 [https://perma.cc/ 
RM4P-NQ9C]; see also Sophie Brown, Brand Wars: Battling China’s Trademark Squatters, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/17/world/asia/china-trademark-squatters-penfolds [https://perma.cc/ 
CX87-ZJVP] ( last updated July 17, 2014) (describing Tesla case and providing other examples of 
trademark trolls using famous American marks). 
17. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 164 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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marks.18 The application of this principle has thus been relatively hypocritical, and 
the United States must get beyond this legal two-facedness. 
This inconsistent application must be resolved. Under the Lanham Act, the 
well-known marks doctrine should be applied for the protection of foreign marks 
as an exception to the “use” principles of territoriality. Therefore, well-known 
foreign marks should be registerable in the United States upon a good faith showing 
of actual famousness and use in a particular region. Courts should thus incorporate 
Article 6bis’ well-known marks doctrine in disputes involving foreign companies 
seeking trademark rights in the United States. Simply put, the well-known marks 
doctrine should be applicable in domestic trademark registration and litigation. 
Numerous scholars have analyzed and debated the well-known marks doctrine 
and the resulting circuit split over the past few years. However, only a few have 
evaluated Article 6bis and considered whether it directly binds the United States.19 
Some pieces have conducted a self-execution analysis (as I do in Section II(A) 
below), but these happen in the context of other Articles in the Paris Convention.20 
Further, this Note is different because it incorporates analysis of the Second 
Circuit’s decision, which other scholarship has not done. 
To provide further support to the research and work already devoted to this 
arena of trademark law analysis, I will present my findings in a different fashion. 
This Note will examine whether the treaty has immediate effect on American law, 
analyze where the two circuits have split, and attempt to remedy that split. I will 
address the remedy in two ways. First, I will argue that the Lanham Act, through a 
trinity of sections, has the well-known marks doctrine impliedly tied into its 
language. This will come from a reading of the statute that differs from the 
interpretation the Second Circuit took in ITC. Additionally, I will reflect on the 
opinions of Professor J. Thomas McCarthy and reiterate his recommendation that 
the Lanham Act should be amended to incorporate the doctrine into its text directly. 
 
18. See treaties cited supra note 3. 
19. See, e.g., Jamey Minnihan, Having Your Cake and Eating It Too: U.S. Treatment of Well-
Known Foreign Trademarks and Its Global Market Implications, 50 GONZ. L. REV. 219, 220 (2015); 
Robert C. Bird & Elizabeth Brown, The Protection of Well-Known Foreign Marks in the United States: 
Potential Global Responses to Domestic Ambivalence, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1 (2012); Lisa  
P. Ramsey, Free Speech and International Obligations to Protect Trademarks, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 405, 406 
(2010); Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Honoring International Obligations in U.S. Trademark Law: How the 
Lanham Act Protects Well-Known Foreign Marks (and Why the Second Circuit Was Wrong), 84 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 1347, 1348 (2010); James Faris, The Famous Marks Exception to the Territoriality Principle in 
American Trademark Law, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 451 (2009); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The Other Famous 
Marks Doctrine, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 757 (2008); Geri L. Haight & Philip 
Catanzano, The Effects of Global Priority of Trademark Rights, 91 MASS. L. REV. 18 (2007). But  
cf. Brandon Barker, The Power of the Well-Known Trademark: Courts Should Consider Article 6bis of the 
Paris Convention an Integrated Part of Section 44 of the Lanham Act, 81 WASH. L. REV. 363 (2006) 
(arguing that Article 6bis is not self-executing, but providing arguments that a plain reading analysis of 
Lanham Act sections 44(b), 44(h), and 44(i) “reveals that the Paris Convention’s well-known marks 
doctrine is a part of federal trademark law”). Note that the Barker article was published before the 
Second Circuit’s decision in ITC and the resulting circuit split. 
20. See sources cited supra note 19. 
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In this Note, I will discuss how best to resolve the circuit split. To do so, I 
divide my analysis into four main parts. In Part I, I will first provide a background 
of two important areas of American federal law––trademark protection and treaty 
interpretation in the domestic context. From there, I will transition into a short 
description of the Paris Convention and the well-known marks doctrine. 
Subsequently, I will discuss the issues presented with the doctrine, from 
controversies over territoriality to the split of authority between the Ninth and 
Second Circuit Courts of Appeal. The background may seem lengthy, but it is 
necessary to provide the appropriate context for the issues. Once I establish the 
necessary background for this Note, Part II will analyze Article 6bis in two different 
contexts. First, I will examine whether Article 6bis is self-executing. This means that 
I will evaluate whether domestic courts can use this provision and read it as applying 
directly into American law from the treaty itself, rather than through actual 
legislation. Following that discussion, Part III will demonstrate that despite 
whatever result comes from the self-execution analysis, Article 6bis and its 
protection of well-known marks is in fact applicable under United States law 
through a trinity of sections of the Lanham Act. Therefore, this Note will argue 
against the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the Act’s plain meaning and assert that 
the well-known marks doctrine does in fact have a place in domestic law. Finally, 
Part IV will discuss the next steps that must be taken regarding the implementation 
of the well-known marks doctrine. Thus, foreign parties should be able to bring 
actions for trademark infringement of their well-known marks in United States 
courts, request cancellation of the registered infringing marks, and seek damages 
and injunctive relief for any infringement of their well-known trademarks. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Lanham Act and Its Role in Protecting Trademarks in the United States 
A trademark is a designation specifically used to “identify the goods of a 
person.”21 To become recognized as a trademark, the designation must identify the 
source of one seller’s goods and distinguish that source from other sources.22 
The first federal trademark statute was enacted in 1870, but it was held 
unconstitutional because it was not limited to interstate commerce. The Supreme 
Court thus found that this statute was beyond Congress’s powers under the 
copyright and patent clause.23 Congress then enacted a statute in 1881 applicable 
only to marks used in commerce with foreign nations and Indian tribes.24 
Thereafter, Congress utilized its commerce clause powers to enact the “first modern 
 
21. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2016). 
22. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 3:1. 
23. In re Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt e. (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
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federal trademark registration statute” in 1905.25 The 1905 statute was then replaced 
by the current federal trademark statute, the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, in 1946.26 
There are two primary purposes behind trademark law. First, it serves to 
protect consumers from deception and confusion over trade symbols.27 Second, 
trademark law serves to protect a potential plaintiff’s infringed trademark as 
property.28 Indeed, “[t]he law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-
law tort of deceit: its general concern is with protecting consumers from confusion 
as to source.”29 Simply, “the keystone of that portion of unfair competition law 
which relates to trademarks is the avoidance of a likelihood of confusion in the 
minds of the buying public.”30 
Moreover, trademarks play a role in the global marketplace and in each 
individual market society. “Trademarks are a universal phenomenon in that the legal 
system of almost every nation in the world recognizes some form of identification 
of the source and quality of goods.”31 Further, “in free market economies, 
trademarks are legally recognized and protected as an inherent feature of the 
marketplace and of consumer protection.”32 
It is important to understand what exactly can constitute a trademark and how 
the Lanham Act serves to protect the two interests discussed above. “A trademark 
is a word, name, symbol, device, or other designation, or a combination of such 
 
25. Id. 
26. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1157 (2012). 
27. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2:2 (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505  
U.S. 763, 766 n.4 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is 
twofold. One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a 
particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to 
get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the 
public the product, he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. 
This is the well-established rule of law protecting both the public and the trade-mark owner.”). 
28. Id. 
29. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2:8 (referencing as example Kentucky Fried Chicken  
Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 382 (5th Cir. 1977)) (“Unfair competition  
is a common law tort that occurs when one business entity ‘palms off’ its products as those of 
another . . . . The determinative question is whether the tortfeasor’s practices are likely to mislead 
customers into believing that the product emanates from or has been endorsed by the claimant.”); see 
also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28 (2003) (“The Lanham Act was 
intended to make ‘actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks,’ and ‘to protect persons 
engaged in . . . commerce against unfair competition.’”); Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773 n.15 (“[T]he 
protection of trademarks and trade dress under § 43(a) serves the same statutory purpose of preventing 
deception and unfair competition.”); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 
(1989) (“The law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit: its general 
concern is with protecting consumers from confusion as to source.”). 
30. See MCCARTHY, supra note 29. 
31. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2:6 (4th ed.) (citing PINNER’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD 
UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (2d ed. 1979); TRADEMARKS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (West 
Group); DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS (L. Nelson 
1982); LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION (1975)). 
32. Id. 
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designations, that is distinctive of a person’s goods or services and that is used in a 
manner that identifies those goods or services and distinguishes them from the 
goods or services of others.”33 Similarly, “[a] service mark is a trademark that is used 
in connection with services.”34 
By establishing a uniform federal trademark law in the 1940s, “Congress 
determined that a sound public policy requires that trademarks should receive 
nationally the greatest protection that can be given them.”35 The Lanham Act was 
designed to “unify the common law of unfair competition and trademark 
protection.”36 Additionally, to provide a large scope of relief, Congress adopted the 
Lanham Act in broad rather than constricting language.37 
Congress had authority to enact the Lanham Act because it regulates conduct 
which is deemed to occur in interstate or foreign commerce. Unlike its power over 
regulating patents and copyrights, Congress does not garner its ability to regulate 
this arm of intellectual property law from Article One, Section Eight, Clause Eight 
of the Constitution.38 Instead, it is derived from Congress’s power to legislate in 
matters of interstate and foreign commerce under Article One, Section Eight, 
Clause Three.39 Additionally, trademark law can be applied to extraterritorial 
matters.40 
The Lanham Act provides that no mark used in interstate commerce can be 
refused registration, unless it meets a statutory bar. Subject to some exceptions,  
a mark may be refused registration if it “consists or comprises of” either:  
(1) “immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or 
falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or 
national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute”;41 (2) “the flag or coat 
of arms or other insignia of the United States, or of any State or municipality, or of 
 
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 1995); see also  
id., cmt. g (expanding on this definition. “The subject matter of trademark law was initially limited to 
fanciful or arbitrary words and symbols. This limitation excluded not only descriptive words and 
symbols, but also other devices that could identify the source of goods, such as the physical appearance 
of the goods or the appearance of labels, wrappers, containers, or advertising materials that accompany 
the goods in the marketplace. When such features in fact served to distinguish the goods of a particular 
producer, they were protected, together with descriptive marks, in an action for unfair competition. As 
the distinctions between the actions for trademark infringement and unfair competition diminished, the 
law of trademarks eventually subsumed descriptive designations that had acquired significance as 
indications of source.”). 
34. Id. 
35. Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985) (quoting  
S. REP. NO. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1946)). 
36. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 846 n.2 (1982). 
37. See Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should Be the Reach of 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REV. 671, 679–81 (1984) (describing Congress’s intent 
in drafting the Lanham Act). 
38. Clowers, supra note 14, at 5. 
39. Id. 
40. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952). 
41. Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012). 
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any foreign nation”;42 (3) “[a] name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular 
living individual except by his written consent, or the name, signature, or portrait of 
a deceased President”;43 or if it is (4) so close to another mark as to cause confusion 
or mistake.44 Moreover, if the mark is either: (1) merely descriptive or 
misdescriptive; (2) “primarily geographically descriptive”; (3) “primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive”; (4) primarily a surname; or  
(5) functional, then the mark may be refused registration.45 However, if the mark is 
either: (1) descriptive or misdescriptive, (2) primarily geographically descriptive, or 
(3) primarily a surname, then it may be granted registration if it has acquired 
secondary meaning.46 
And what is secondary meaning? Secondary meaning is a term of art “used 
generally to indicate that a mark . . . ‘has come through use to be uniquely associated 
with a specific source.’”47 The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]o establish 
secondary meaning, a manufacturer must show that, in the minds of the public, the 
primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the product 
rather than the product itself.”48 As noted, a key feature of trademark law is to protect 
consumers. Simply, if a consumer recognizes a mark and associates it with a supplier 
of goods or services rather than associating the mark with the goods or services 
themselves, the mark has acquired secondary meaning. 
Finally, the key vehicle for bringing claims for infringement of unregistered 
marks comes under Lanham Act section 43(a)(1)(A). This section is “the only 
provision in the Lanham Act that protects an unregistered mark.”49 Moreover, “[i]ts 
purpose is to prevent customer confusion regarding a product’s source . . . and to 
enable those that fashion a product to differentiate it from others on the market.”50 
Under this section, 
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any 
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false 
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of 
fact, which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as 
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another 
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, 
services, or commercial activities by another person . . . shall be liable in a 
 
42. Id. § 1052(b). 
43. Id. § 1052(c). 
44. Id. § 1052(d). 
45. Id. § 1052(e). 
46. Id. § 1052(f). 
47. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 766 n.4 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13, cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990)). 
48. Id. (citing Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982)) (emphasis 
added). 
49. Centaur Commc’ns, Ltd. v. A/S/M Commc’ns, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1220 (2d Cir. 1987). 
50. Id. (citation omitted). 
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civil action by any person who believes that he or she is likely to be 
damaged by such act.51 
It is necessary to note the role of this section because plaintiffs invoking the 
well-known marks doctrine in federal court will most likely be advocating for an 
unregistered mark—one that was instead taken by someone within the United 
States. Further, as I will discuss later, section 43(a), coupled with 44(b) and 44(h), 
impliedly provides a legal recognition of the doctrine. 
B. The Paris Convention and Its Role in Protecting Trademarks Across the Globe 
In 1970, the United States Senate ratified Articles 13–30 of the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (“Paris Convention”).52 Three 
years later, President Richard Nixon—through the advice of the Senate—ratified 
the first twelve Articles.53 
The Paris Convention is the foundation of international trademark law,54 as 
reflected in Article 6(3). Under this Article, “[a] mark duly registered in a country of 
the Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in the other 
countries of the Union, including the country of origin.”55 The Paris Convention 
goes on to contain a “national treatment” tenet supporting this approach to 
trademark law jurisdiction, emphasizing that 
[n]ationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection of 
industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the 
advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may hereinafter grant, 
to nationals; all without prejudice to the rights specially provided for by 
this Convention. Consequently, they shall have the same protection as the 
latter, and the same legal remedy against any infringement of their rights, 
provided that the conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals are 
complied with.56 
Professor McCarthy summarizes the history of and intent behind the Paris 
Convention as follows: 
The Paris Convention is essentially a compact between the various member 
nations to accord in their own countries to citizens of the other member 
nations trademark and other rights comparable to those accorded their 
own citizens by their domestic law. The underlying principle is that foreign 
nationals should be given the same treatment in each of the member 
countries as that country makes available to its own citizens. The 
Convention is not premised upon the idea that the trademark laws of each 
member nation shall be given extraterritorial application, but on exactly the 
 
51. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
52. Paris Convention, supra note 1, at art. 6. 
53. Id. at art. 2. 
54. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 
37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505 (1997). 
55. Paris Convention, supra note 1, at art. 6(3). 
56. Id. at art. 2(1). 
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converse principle that each nation’s law shall have only territorial 
application. Thus, the Paris Convention creates nothing that even remotely 
resembles a “world mark” or an “international registration.” Rather, it 
recognizes the principle of the territoriality of trademarks: a mark exists 
only under the laws of each sovereign nation.57 
C. The Well-Known Marks Doctrine 
Among the various Articles within the Paris Convention is the subject of this 
Note—Article 6bis, entitled “Marks: Well-Known Marks.”58 Under this Article, States 
Party agree to refuse registration of a reproduction, imitation, or translation of a 
mark that is considered “well known” if it is likely to cause confusion.59 
Article 6bis was introduced into the Paris Convention by the Revision 
Conference of The Hague in 1925. It was later modified by the Revision 
Conferences of London in 1934 and of Lisbon in 1958. At the latter Conference, 
the Article was very thoroughly discussed. Its application, which formerly 
concerned only the refusal or cancellation of the registration of a mark conflicting 
with a mark which is well known in the country concerned, was then extended to a 
prohibition of the use of the mark first mentioned.60 
The Paris Convention’s Article 6bis is considered the cornerstone of 
international protection of well-known marks.61 Subsequent treaties take this 
language and expand upon it. For instance, the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT TRIPS”) 
expressly references and extends the doctrine. GATT TRIPS Article 16(1) extends 
this idea to service marks and requires that these marks be well-known only to a 
“relevant sector of the public.”62 
The three sections of the Paris Convention’s Article 6bis provide that 
(1) The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio if their legislation so 
permits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the 
registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a 
reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a 
mark considered by the competent authority of the country of registration 
or use to be well known in that country as being already the mark of a 
person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or 
similar goods. These provisions shall also apply when the essential part of 
the mark constitutes a reproduction of any such well-known mark or an 
imitation liable to create confusion therewith. 
 
57. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:25 (referencing Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 
633 (2d Cir. 1956)). 
58. Paris Convention, supra note 1, at art. 6bis. 
59. Id. 
60. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 13, at 89. 
61. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:62. 
62. GATT TRIPS, supra note 3, at art. 16(2). 
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(2) A period of at least five years from the date of registration shall be 
allowed for requesting the cancellation of such a mark. The countries of 
the Union may provide for a period within which the prohibition of use 
must be requested. 
 
(3) No time limit shall be fixed for requesting the cancellation or the 
prohibition of the use of marks registered or used in bad faith.63 
Article 6bis’s purpose is to avoid the registration and use of a trademark, liable 
to create confusion with another mark already well known in the country of such registration 
or use. This comes into play even if the latter well-known mark is not protected in 
that country by a registration which would normally prevent the registration or use 
of the conflicting mark.64 
This doctrine differs depending on which country is evaluating it. But 
generally, the well-known marks doctrine “is a concept under which a trademark or 
service mark is protected within a nation if it is well-known in that nation, even 
though the mark is not actually used or registered in that nation.”65 Marks can 
become known in a nation through various means, even in the absence of sales.66 
These methods include “advertising in internationally distributed media, such as 
magazines or television, by returning travelers who saw the mark in other nations, 
or by discussion in local media by reporters and commentators.”67 
The United States, however, does not have a specific category of marks 
defined as “famous” or “well-known.” “This is because U.S. law protects a 
mark against infringement or registration by another, even in the absence of 
registration, if it is so well known in the United States that confusion is likely to 
result.”68 
“The well-known marks doctrine is especially important in nations that do not 
recognize (or have very narrow recognition of ) common law rights in unregistered 
marks.”69 Further, “[i]n many nations of the world, a mark is not protected from 
an infringing use or registration by another unless it is registered in that nation for 
those particular goods.”70 Unlike the United States, “[m]any nations do not 
recognize unregistered, or common law, rights in marks.” Thus, “[t]he well-known 
marks doctrine is an exception to that rule. Even in those nations, a trademark or 
service mark is protected if it is well-known in that nation even though the mark is 
not actually used or registered in that nation.”71 Further, Article 6bis alone will 
 
63. Paris Convention, supra note 1, at art. 6bis. 
64. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 13, at 90. 




69. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:61. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
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protect a well-known mark for only “identical or similar goods.”72 Because of this 
limitation, 
Kraft arguably could not enjoin the use of KRAFT on cigarette lighters 
(assuming most countries would consider food products and cigarette 
lighters to be unrelated goods). Furthermore, United Air Lines could not 
enjoin the use of MILEAGE PLUS on frequent flyer programs because 
the Paris Convention does not protect service marks.73 
In many nations, a mark is not protected from an infringing use or registration 
by another unless it is registered in that nation for a set of particular goods or 
services; indeed, many nations do not recognize unregistered, or common law, 
rights in marks.74 The well-known marks doctrine is an exception to that rule. Unlike 
in the United States, a well-known trademark can be protected in another Paris 
Convention nation even though the mark is not actually used or registered in that 
nation.75 So then, “[o]ne common use of the doctrine is to fight trademark pirates 
who rush to register a well-known mark on goods on which it has not yet been 
registered in a nation by the legitimate foreign owner.”76 
Moreover, a trademark may be well known in a country before its registration 
there and, in view of the possible repercussions of publicity in other countries, even 
before it is used in the state. The question of whether a trademark is well known in 
a country will be determined by its competent administrative or judicial authorities.77 
Finally, a Member State is not obliged to protect well-known trademarks which 
have not been used within its territory. However, it will be free to do so depending 
on its own judicial and legislative applications.78 Further, the protection of well-
known marks applies only with respect to other marks filed, registered, or used for 
identical or similar goods. Evaluation of whether this condition is fulfilled is done by 
the administrative or judicial authorities of the country in which protection is 
claimed.79 
With the relevant legal background established, I will now provide a brief 
discussion of the primary issues presented with the “well-known marks” doctrine. 
I first focus on principles of territoriality. Then, I will provide a short evaluation of 
the facts and legal analysis the Ninth and Second Circuits took when the circuits 
made their respective differing decisions on the validity of the doctrine in American 
jurisprudence. 
 
72. 3 MARY M. SQUYRES & NANETTE NORTON, TRADEMARK PRACTICE THROUGHOUT THE 
WORLD § 27:3 (2018) (emphasis in original). 
73. Id. 
74. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:61. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. § 29:25. 
77. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 13, at 91. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
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D. The Problem 
1. Territoriality Principles 
Because the United States recognizes common law trademark rights, the well-
known marks doctrine can strike at odds with established legal theories of 
territoriality––the idea that “trademark rights exist in each country solely according 
to that country’s statutory scheme.”80 Whether or not the well-known marks 
doctrine can be invoked in American law as an exception to territoriality principles 
is the primary question behind the circuit split at issue. 
In the international trademark context, there has been a shift as to the scope 
of geographical protection provided to trademarks based on which mark holder 
came first. The two most common views in this priority analysis are the universality 
and territorial understanding of trademark protection. 
The universality principle “stands for the proposition that a trademark serves 
the sole purpose of identifying the source of a product. Under this principle, a 
trademark is valid if it correctly identifies the origin or source of the product, 
regardless of where the consumer purchases the product.”81 This was the American 
view until 1923.82 
In A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, the United States Supreme Court moved away 
from the universality principle and towards a territorial understanding of trademark 
priority. Here, the plaintiff purchased a French cosmetic firm’s American business 
and used its goodwill and trademarks on face powder.83 Then, the plaintiff 
continued to sell the French firm’s face powder, using “substantially the same form 
of box and label for its predecessors,” but selected only colors “suitable for the 
American market.”84 These boxes and labels had “come to be understood by the 
public [in the United States] as meaning goods coming from the plaintiff.”85 The 
plaintiff sued a third party manufacturer who purchased the same exact face powder 
and resold it in the United States using the original French boxes for trademark 
infringement.86 The Court held that the plaintiff’s trademark rights were actually 
infringed.87 Justice Holmes reasoned that the “monopoly of a trade-mark . . . deals 
with a delicate matter that may be of great value but that easily is destroyed, and 
therefore should be protected with corresponding care.” So, he explained that “it is 
the trade-mark of the plaintiff only in the United States and indicates in law, and, it 
is found, by public understanding, that the goods come from the plaintiff although 
 
80. Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 599 (5th Cir. 1985). 
81. Am. Circuit Breaker Corp. v. Or. Breakers Inc., 406 F.3d 577, 581 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 
1 JEROME GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 4.05[5] 
(2004)). 
82. See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923). 
83. Id. at 690. 
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not made by it.”88 Further, the plaintiff’s goods were “sold and could only be sold 
with the good will of the business that the plaintiff bought. It stakes the reputation 
of the plaintiff upon the character of the goods.”89 Simply, the Court explained that 
defendant’s use of the mark misrepresented the origin of the goods, and the plaintiff 
was deprived the marketplace advantage it expected from owning the U.S. 
trademark rights it acquired from the French company. In reaching this decision, 
the Court dismissed the concept of a universality scope of trademark rights. 
Now, the American trademark system comports with what is known as the 
territoriality principle of trademark law. Under the territoriality principle, a 
trademark is recognized as having a separate existence in each sovereign territory in 
which it is registered or legally recognized as a mark.90 In the United States, this 
territoriality of marks doctrine is “basic to American trademark law.”91 Thus, a 
mark’s ability to be well-known is confined to its national territory, until it is used 
in the United States.92 Since this shift, the territoriality principle continues to play 
an extensive role in American trademark jurisprudence. 
The Paris Convention also follows the territoriality doctrine. In explaining the 
territoriality principle under the context of the Paris Convention, Professor 
McCarthy says, with an example 
[T]he Paris Convention recognizes that a U.S. registered trademark for 
foreign-made goods can have a separate legal existence in the United States 
and that this separate mark and its good will are assignable. That is, 
manufacturer Alpha may own the mark in France, but exclusive importer 
Zeta may own the mark in the United States, if it is validly assigned by 
Alpha. Similarly, a U.S. company with international operations may split 
the company territorially and sell off the international part of its business, 
retaining only the domestic portion.93 
 
88. Id. at 692. 
89. Id. (citation omitted). 
90. Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying the territoriality rule to service 
marks); 2 LADAS, supra note 31, § 732; 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:1 (“The concept of territoriality 
is basic to trademark law; trademark rights exist in each country solely according to that country’s 
statutory scheme.” (citing Person’s Co., Ltd. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990))). 
91. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 155 (2d Cir. 2007); accord Topps Co. v. Cadbury 
Stani S.A.I.C., 526 F.3d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the legal effect of an assignment of a 
trademark in Argentina is not to be judged by U.S. trademark law, but by Argentinean law); id. (“The 
principle of territoriality is fundamental to trademark law. A trademark has a separate legal existence 
under each country’s laws, and trademark rights exist in each country solely according to that nation’s 
laws.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24, cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1995) 
(“The premise of the universality principle that trademarks necessarily identify the original 
manufacturer has been rejected in our domestic law.”). 
92. Person’s, 900 F.2d at 1569–70 (finding the Japanese trademark “Person’s,” though known 
in Japan, has no reputation in the United States; thus, the known foreign mark had no priority in the 
United States, and an argument under Article 6bis could not be applicable to the instant case); see 
also Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The territoriality 
principle . . . says that [p]riority of trademark rights in the United States depends solely upon priority 
of use in the United States, not on priority of use anywhere in the world.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
93. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §29:1. 
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In American domestic law, the territorial scope of an unregistered mark is 
limited to the territory in which the mark is known and recognized by those in the 
defined group of potential customers.94 Further, the national senior user of an 
unregistered mark cannot stop the use of a territorially “remote” good faith national 
junior user who was first to use the mark in that territory.95 
Again, territoriality principles are important because of the various issues 
deriving from the circuit split. The Ninth Circuit held that the well-known marks 
doctrine was an exception to this rule. However, the Second Circuit held it was not. 
This dispute is the reason for the circuit split. 
2. The Circuit Split 
In 2005, the Ninth Circuit held that the well-known marks doctrine does have 
effect in domestic law, but it described the doctrine as a “famous mark exception.”96 
In Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc., Mexican company Grupo Gigante 
was able to stop an American company from using its name for a grocery store 
chain. The court held that the mark “Gigante” for a large chain of grocery stores in 
Mexico was sufficiently well-known among Mexican-Americans in Southern 
California. The court found that, prior to Grupo Gigante’s 1999 entry into the 
United States’ market by opening Gigante stores in Los Angeles, the Mexican 
company had already created rights superior to the Dallo brothers first use in 1995 
of Gigante in San Diego. Thus, the mark had seniority over the Dallo brothers’ 
Gigante grocery stores. The District Court found that the Mexican mark was well-
known in the United States because it had become clear that the mark had 
developed a secondary meaning in the Southern California territory. But the parties 
knowingly co-existed on opposite sides of the border for four years before Grupo 
Gigante filed suit. This led the District Court to find an estoppel by laches, barring 
any injunction.97 
The Ninth Circuit found on appeal that the evidence did not support a 
summary judgment decision that Grupo Gigante’s Mexican Gigante mark was in 
fact well-known in Southern California prior to the Dallo brothers’ 1995 first use 
there. However, the appellate court found that U.S. law did recognize such an 
exception to the normal rule of territoriality: the well-known mark exception. 
In ruling that Grupo Gigante had trademark rights over the Dallo brothers, 
the Ninth Circuit stated the following: 
We hold . . . that there is a famous mark exception to the territoriality principle. 
While the territoriality principle is a long-standing and important doctrine 
within trademark law, it cannot be absolute. An absolute territoriality rule 
without a famous-mark exception would promote consumer confusion 
 
94. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918); see also Hanover Star 
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415–16 (1916); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26:2. 
95. United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 100. 
96. Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094. 
97. Id. at 1092. 
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and fraud. Commerce crosses borders. In this nation of immigrants, so do 
people. Trademark is, at its core, about protecting against consumer 
confusion and “palming off.” There can be no justification for using 
trademark law to fool immigrants into thinking that they are buying from 
the store they liked back home.98 
But, in 2007, the Second Circuit completely disagreed. In ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, 
Inc., the Second Circuit examined the trademark rights of an Indian corporation. As 
part of its analysis, the court evaluated the role the well-known marks doctrine plays 
in American law. It is important to know the facts of the case before discussing the 
Second Circuit’s conclusion. 
ITC Limited and ITC Hotels Limited are Indian corporations, and they held 
the registered United States trademark “BUKHARA” for restaurant services. 
Defendants Punchgini, Inc., Bukhara Grill II, Inc., and others were former 
employees of ITC’s Bukhara restaurant, which closed in 1991. After the closure, the 
defendants opened their own restaurant using the BUKHARA mark. The plaintiffs 
sued the defendants in the Southern District of New York, claiming that defendants’ 
use of a similar mark and related trade dress constituted trademark infringement, 
unfair competition, and false advertising in violation of federal and state law. Judge 
Lynch granted summary judgment for the defendants because plaintiffs had 
abandoned their mark. While plaintiff once had a Bukhara restaurant in New York, 
it closed in 1991 after five years of operation. However, the plaintiffs continued to 
operate Bukhara restaurants in four locations in Asia. Thus, on appeal, the plaintiffs 
asserted that the well-known marks doctrine nevertheless permitted them to sue 
defendants for unfair competition, because its continued international use of the 
mark led to a federally protected right.99 
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit refused to find that the well-
known marks rule was a part of federal law to give plaintiff a ground to assert 
infringement. In so doing, it concluded that Congress had not yet incorporated that 
doctrine into federal trademark law.100 This ruling was contrary to the Ninth Circuit 
view noted above and created a split of authority among the circuits. Despite treaty 
obligations, the Second Circuit held that well-known marks doctrine does not 
provide a cause of action because it has not yet been incorporated into federal law.101 
In reaching that holding, the court analyzed the plain meaning of the Lanham Act’s 
various sections for an express and explicit recognition of the well-known marks 
doctrine as embodied in the Paris Convention and in the TRIPS Agreement.102 But 
because the statute did not explicitly recognize the rule in its words, the court 
concluded that it was not a part of U.S. federal law.103 The court also rejected the 
 
98. Id. at 1094 (emphasis added). 
99. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2007). 
100. Id. 
101. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §29:4. 
102. See ITC, 482 F.3d at 142. 
103. See id. 
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notion that federal recognition of the well-known marks rule is implicit in the 
structure of the Lanham Act.104 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit did recognize that 
cogent policy arguments existed in favor of recognizing the doctrine in federal 
law,105 but the court said that those arguments should be directed to Congress, not 
the judiciary.106 
In its analysis, the Second Circuit found that “Congress’s specificity in dealing 
with registered marks cautions against reading a famous marks exception into 
sections 44(b) and (h).”107 This is because the sections “nowhere reference the 
doctrine, much less the circumstances under which it would appropriately apply 
despite the fact that the foreign mark was not used in this country.”108 The court 
was “mindful that Congress has not hesitated to amend the Lanham Act to effect 
its intent with respect to trademark protection.”109 In evaluating these various 
amendments, the court noted an “absence of any statutory provision expressly 
incorporating the famous marks doctrine or Articles 6bis and 16(2).”110 When 
considered with the fact that the Act was amended over thirty times, this lacking 
was found to be “all the more significant.”111 Thus, the Second Circuit felt that 
before it could read the Lanham Act to include “such a significant departure from 
the principle of territoriality, [the court] will wait for Congress to express its intent 
more clearly.”112 
Most importantly, the Second Circuit held that 
[W]e do not ourselves discern in the plain language of sections 44(b) and 
(h) a clear congressional intent to incorporate a famous marks exception 
into federal unfair competition law. Section 44(b) guarantees foreign mark 
holders only “the benefits of this section . . . to the extent necessary to give 
effect to any . . . convention, treaty or reciprocal law,” as well as the “rights 
to which any owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by this chapter.”113 
 
104. See id. 
105. Id. (citing De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. Debeers Diamond Syndicate Inc., 2005  
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9307, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2005) (“Recognition of the famous marks doctrine is 
particularly desirable in a world where international travel is commonplace and where the Internet and 
other media facilitate the rapid creation of business goodwill that transcends borders.”); Frederick  
W. Mostert, Well-Known and Famous Marks: Is Harmony Possible in the Global Village, 86 TRADEMARK 
REP. 103, 106 (1996) (“The protection of the global trading system through the prevention of piracy 
and unfair exploitation of well-known marks has become essential.”)). But see id. (citing Badaracco  
v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984) (“The relevant question is not whether, as an abstract matter, the 
rule advocated by petitioners accords with good policy. The question we must consider is whether the 
policy petitioners favor is that which Congress effectuated by its enactment of [the statute].”)) (“The 
fact that a doctrine may promote sound policy, however, is not a sufficient ground for its judicial 
recognition, particularly in an area regulated by statute.”). 







113. Id. at 163 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2018)). 
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The Second Circuit found that there was no “famous marks exception” to the 
territoriality principle written directly into the Lanham Act.114 Because of this, the 
Second Circuit refused to hold that the well-known marks doctrine has no place in 
federal law, despite the court approving of the various policy concerns.115 The 
Second Circuit further emphasized “that any policy arguments in favor of the 
famous marks doctrine must be submitted to Congress for it to determine whether 
and under what circumstances to accord federal recognition to such an exception 
to the basic principle of territoriality.”116 
In my view, the Second Circuit viewpoint is wrong. Article 6bis explicitly 
requests that trademark registries of states parties refuse to register a mark that may 
cause confusion to another. The Lanham Act provides the same exact principle. 
Moreover, while not directly invoked in its language, a reading of Lanham Act 
sections 43(a), 44(b), and 44(h) ties together to create a cause of action for a foreign 
holder of a well-known mark. 
II. BECAUSE IT IS NOT SELF-EXECUTING, ARTICLE 6BIS OF THE TREATY OF 
PARIS ALONE DOES NOT HAVE AUTOMATIC EFFECT AS DOMESTIC LAW 
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 
With the relevant background and problem defined in Section I, I hope to 
provide an alternative solution to the well-known marks dilemma. To do this, I will 
first examine whether the Paris Convention, and whether Article 6bis itself, is “self-
executing” under American law regarding treaty interpretation. This is important 
because a treaty provision is enforceable in court only if it is, in fact, self-executing, 
or if it does not require implementing legislation to become effective as domestic 
law immediately upon entry into force. 
The Paris Convention is not self-executing. Thus, legislation must be adopted 
to establish its terms within American law. 
A. What Makes a Self-Executing Treaty? 
Section 2 of Article VI of the United States Constitution, otherwise known as 
the Supremacy Clause, places treaties made under the “Authority of the United 
States” as part of the “supreme Law of the Land.”117 Indeed, international law is 
part of American domestic law.118 But, if there is a “controlling executive or 
legislative act or judicial decision,” the United States may supersede its obligations 
under international law.119 Moreover, not every treaty provision is enforceable in 
 
114. Id. at 165. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
118. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
119. Id. 
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the courts of the United States.120 In evaluating enforceability of treaty provisions, 
the Supreme Court has instructed courts to undergo a “self-executing” analysis.121 
In a self-executing analysis, the ultimate question is whether the treaty is one 
that “operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision,” or rather 
“addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department.”122 Thus, when 
determining whether a treaty provision is self-executing, courts focus on whether a 
treaty provision is appropriate for direct judicial application.123 This question is 
ordinarily resolved by examining the international obligation assumed by the United 
States—as described by the text and context of the treaty provision, along with 
other treaty materials—and assessing whether it is consistent with an understanding 
by the treaty-makers that the provision would be directly enforceable in  
U.S. courts.124 
There are two prongs in a self-execution analysis. First, a treaty is self-
executing when “the textual provisions indicate that the President and Senate 
intended for the agreement to have domestic effect.”125 Second, courts must 
evaluate and “decide whether a treaty’s terms reflect a determination by the 
President who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has 
domestic effect.”126 In this vein, a treaty provision will not be enforced by  
U.S. courts if its obligations are addressed to the political branches of the 
government rather than to the judiciary.127 Therefore, if the treaty provision 
specifically calls for domestic legislative implementation, then it will not be self-
executing. Moreover, when the terms of a treaty provision “import a contract, when 
either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself 
to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the 
contract before it can become a rule for the Court.”128 
When evaluating a specific treaty or provision, courts typically inquire whether 
it is sufficiently precise or obligatory for judicial application, and whether immediate 
application of its terms are foreseeable.129 This evaluation requires analyzing the 
particular features of each treaty provision in the context of the treaty as a whole.130 
Courts have also looked at the United States’ obligations under international law 
and examined how those obligations would have been understood by the relevant 
 
120. CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 41 (2d  
ed. 2015). 
121. Id. 
122. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829); accord Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505, 538 
(2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
123. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 110 (AM. LAW INST., Council 
Draft No. 1, 2015). 
124. Id. 
125. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 519. 
126. Id. at 521. 
127. BRADLEY, supra note 120. 
128. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829). 
129. BRADLEY, supra note 120. 
130. Id. 
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treaty-makers in relation to the self-execution doctrine.131 Further, “[c]ourts have 
tended to treat mandatory, present-tense provisions in bilateral treaties as self-
executing, especially if the provisions concern the rights of individuals.”132 But 
“[c]ourts have been less likely to treat multilateral treaties as self-executing, 
especially when the treaties overlap with federal statutes.”133 
Some lower courts have adopted multi-factored balancing tests for a self-
execution analysis. In general, these courts evaluate the following factors: (1) “the 
purposes of the treaty and the objectives of its creators;” (2) “the existence of 
domestic procedures and institutions appropriate for direct implementation;”  
(3) “the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods;” and (4) “the 
immediate and long-range consequences of self- or non-self-execution.”134 
There is no determinative case law that expresses whose specific intent, at the 
time of drafting, courts should consider when evaluating whether a treaty provision 
is self-executing. Is it general, including the collective intent of the parties to the 
treaty, or just the intent of the United States treaty-makers? Scholars and courts 
have debated this issue, some maintaining that all parties should be included, and 
others for the idea of considering solely United States intentions. The Draft 
Restatement ( Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law follows the contention that the 
intention of the United States is “dispositive for this issue.”135 Indeed, this appears 
to be the route the Supreme Court took in the most relevant case involving recent 
trends in self-execution analysis, Medellín v. Texas. 
Professor Curtis A. Bradley efficiently outlines the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
analysis of Medellín as follows. First, the Court emphasized that “[o]ur cases simply 
require courts to decide whether a treaty’s terms reflect a determination by the 
President who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has domestic 
effect.”136 Indeed, the Court has “held treaties to be self-executing when the textual 
provisions indicate that the President and Senate intended for the agreement to have 
domestic effect.”137 In summarizing its finding of non-self-execution, the Court 
explained that “[n]othing in the text, background, negotiating and drafting history, 
or practice among signatory nations suggests that the President or Senate intended 
the improbable result of giving the judgments of an international tribunal a higher 
status than that enjoyed by ‘many of our most fundamental constitutional 
 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 42 (citing Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 507–08 (1947); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 
U.S. 332, 341–43 (1924); U.S. v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 418–19 (1886)). 
133. Id. at 42–43 (citing U.S. v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 878–80 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
134. Postal, 589 F.2d at 877 (quoting People of Saipan v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 502 F.2d 
90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974)). 
135. BRADLEY, supra note 120, at 42; see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW, supra note 123, § 111, cmt. h. 
136. Bradley, supra note 120, at 46 (citing Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521 (2008)). 
137. Id. (citing Medellín, 552 U.S. at 519). 
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protections.’”138 Further, the Court relied on the U.S. ratification history for the 
UN Charter rather than on the collective negotiating history.139 
In discerning this intent, the Court placed significant emphasis on treaty text. 
As the Court explained, “That is after all what the Senate looks to in deciding 
whether to approve the treaty.”140 The Court suggested that future-oriented treaty 
language directed generically at the states parties––rather than at their courts––is 
indicative of non-self-execution. An example the Court referenced is the phrase 
“undertakes to comply” in Article 94 of the UN Charter.141 
The Court also rejected a multi-factored approach under which courts would 
rely on “practical, context-specific criteria” in determining whether a treaty 
provision was self- executing.142 According to the Court, this approach would be 
too vague and would improperly “assign to the courts—not the political branches—
the primary role in deciding when and how international agreements will be 
enforced.”143 However, the Court did not rule out more categorical references to 
contextual factors. Professor Bradley believes “it seems likely that considerations 
such as the subject matter of a treaty and whether it addresses individual rights will 
continue to have a bearing on the self-execution analysis.”144 
The Medellín decision appears to have implicitly rejected any strong 
presumption in favor of self-execution.145 This is because the Court “did not 
mention such a presumption, and, in concluding that the treaties in question were 
non-self-executing, it did not require clear evidence of an intent to preclude 
domestic judicial enforcement.”146 Instead, the Court examined the text, structure, 
and ratification history of the treaties to discern whether they were self-executing. 
Moreover, the Court emphasized that “Congress is up to the task of implementing 
non-self-executing treaties.”147 
The Court, however, did not appear to adopt a presumption against self-
execution. Rather, the Court made clear that self-execution should be considered 
on a treaty-by-treaty basis. The Court stated that “under our established precedent, 
some treaties are self-executing and some are not, depending on the treaty.”148 In 
addition, the Court observed that prior decisions that have found treaties to be self-
 
138. Id. (citing Medellín, 552 U.S. at 523). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. (citing Medellín, 552 U.S. at 514). 
141. Id. at 46–67 (citing Medellín, 552 U.S. at 508–09.); see also id. at 51 n.92 (“In a concurrence, 
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority on this point, concluding that the phrase ‘undertakes to comply’ 
in Article 94(1) of the UN Charter, especially when read in context, is best construed as ‘contemplat[ing] 
future action by the political branches.’” (citing Medellín, 552 U.S. at 534 (Stevens, J., concurring))). 
142. Id. at 47 (citing Medellín, 552 U.S. at 549 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
143. Id. (citing Medellín, 552 U.S. at 516). 
144. Id. 
145. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 123, § 110 
para. 3. 
146. BRADLEY, supra note 120, at 42. 
147. Id. (citing Medellín, 552 U.S. at 521). 
148. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 520. 
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executing “stand only for the unremarkable proposition that some international 
agreements are self-executing and others are not.”149 Further, courts do not require 
“talismanic words” for self-execution.150 Simply, “[t]he Court’s invocation of 
deference to the executive branch with respect to self-execution was also formulated 
in treaty-specific terms.”151 
With the relevant law established, I move to an evaluation of the Convention’s 
terms and conduct a self-execution analysis on the Paris Convention as a whole and 
Article 6bis. 
B. Neither the Paris Convention nor Article 6bis Is Self-Executing 
Under this test, neither the Paris Convention as a whole, nor Article 6bis alone, 
is self- executing. The terms of the Paris Convention do not indicate that the 
President and Senate intended for the agreement to have domestic effect. Moreover, 
as has been evidenced in judicial decisions throughout history, the Paris Convention 
requires United States courts to decide whether a treaty’s terms reflect a 
determination by the President who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it, 
that the treaty has domestic effect. 
For starters, Article 25 of the Convention, titled “Implementation of the 
Convention on the Domestic Level ” is as follows: 
(1) Any country party to this Convention undertakes to adopt, in accordance 
with its constitution, the measures necessary to ensure the application of this 
Convention. (2) It is understood that, at the time a country deposits its 
instrument of ratification or accession, it will be in a position under its 
domestic law to give effect to the provisions of this Convention.152 
Additionally, under Article 6, “[t]he conditions for the filing and registration 
of trademarks shall be determined in each country of the Union by its domestic 
legislation.”153 The plain language of these two provisions clearly illustrates that 
legislative action had to be taken in order for the treaty to take effect. 
Some courts have ruled the other way, holding that the terms of the 
Convention are in fact self-executing.154 But these cases were adjudicated before the 
 
149. Id. at 518. 
150. BRADLEY, supra note 120 (citing Medellín, 552 U.S. at 521). 
151. Id. at 47–48. 
152. See Paris Convention, supra note 1, at art. 25 (emphasis added). 
153. Id. at art. 6. 
154. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640–41 (2d Cir. 1956) (dictum 
that Paris Convention is self-executing); Benard Indus. v. Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1422 
(S.D. Fla. 1996) (in denying motion to dismiss a claim founded upon the Paris Convention, the court 
stated, “[t]he court is persuaded by the reasoning in the Davidoff and Roldan decisions which indicate 
that [non-U.S.] parties have rights under the Paris Convention which can be enforced pursuant to that 
Convention”); Laboratorios Roldan, C. por A. v. Tex. Int’l, 902 F. Supp. 1555, 1568 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (in 
granting a preliminary injunction based in part on the Paris Convention, the court reasoned that “under 
§ 44(h) of the Lanham Act and Article 10bis of the Paris Convention, [a Dominican Republic 
corporation] ‘is protected from unfair competition’”); Davidoff Extension S.A. v. Davidoff Int’l,  
Inc., 612 F. Supp. 4, 8 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff’d sub nom. Davidoff Ext. v. Davidoff Int’l, 774 F.2d 1178 
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United States adopted Article 6bis and the entirety of the Paris Convention in 
1973.155 In fact, there has been a historical trend, one that has recently picked up 
some steam, among all the judicial, legislative, and even executive branches of the 
American government to hold that the Paris Convention is not self-executing. 
Indeed, this is the position a majority of United States circuit courts, including the 
Federal Circuit, have taken.156 While there has been some debate, it seems clear that 
the text of the treaty in and of itself does not comport with self-execution, because 
it does not “operate[ ] of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision,” or 
“address[ ] itself to the political, not the judicial department.”157 
On the other hand, WIPO itself argues that Article 6bis is self-executing. As 
discussed in WIPO’s Guide to the Implementation of the Paris Convention, “in 
stipulating that ‘the countries of the Union undertake, etc.’ the Article is drafted 
differently from many other Articles of the Convention, which directly refer to 
rights or obligations of interested parties, or directly regulate a situation at issue.”158 
Additionally, Article 6bis does not “refer only to an undertaking by the countries of 
the Union to legislate on a particular matter . . . .”159 WIPO argues that, “it cannot 
be deemed only to oblige the member States to legislate on the subject concerned, 
but may be considered to contain an undertaking also on behalf of the 
administrative and judicial authorities of these States.”160 Thus, if it is compatible 
with their constitutional systems, Member States “must then give effect to the 
provisions of the Article at the request of interested parties.”161 Even though the 
Article leaves certain liberties to national legislations, it does not exclusively refer to 
them alone.162 
 
(11th Cir. 1985) (“The Paris Convention is self-executing and, by virtue of Article VI of the  
U.S. Constitution, a part of the law to be enforced by the courts”); Master v. Cribben & Sexton  
Co., 202 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (holding that the Paris Convention is self-executing); Ex parte Dorin, 
Inc., 102 U.S.P.Q. 316 (Comm’r Pat. 1954). 
155. Convention Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967, T.I.A.S. No. 7727 art. 1–12 (Aug. 25, 1973). 
156. In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Int’l Café, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock 
Café Int’l, Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1277 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum 
Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298–99 (3d Cir. 1979); Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 371 F.2d 154, 157 (7th  
Cir. 1967); S. REP. NO. 87–1019 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3044, 3045 (stating that “[t]he 
provisions of the Convention of Paris are not self-executing, and legislation is therefore needed to carry 
into effect any provision not already in our present law”); 19 Op. Att’y Gen. 273, 279 (1889) (“[The 
Paris Convention] is therefore not self-executing, but requires legislation to render it effective for the 
modification of existing laws.”); cf. Vanity Fair Mills, 234 F.2d at 640–41 (determining that the Paris 
Convention is self-executing but does not create private rights for acts occurring in foreign countries). 
157. BRADLEY, supra note 120, at 41; see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW, supra note 123, § 110. 




162. Id. (bolstering this point by referencing Article 6bis paragraph (1) (“if their legislation so 
permits”) and paragraph (2) (“a period of at least five years . . . shall be allowed . . . ”; “The countries of 
the Union may provide for a period . . . .”)). 
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Despite this, the Article cannot be self-executing under Medellín, because it 
does not clearly “operate[ ] of itself without the aid of any legislative provision,” or 
“address[ ] itself to the political, not the judicial department.”163 In order to be 
effectuated within the United States, the provision of Article 6bis must be invoked 
in the Lanham Act. This is because of the fact that federal trademark law was 
invoked under the auspices of Congress’s commerce powers. It needs to be 
implemented in law. And again, Article 25 completely overrides WIPO’s assertions, 
because the Article requires each Member State to “undertake[ ] to adopt, in 
accordance with its constitution, the measures necessary to ensure the application 
of this Convention.”164 Even if one article can be read to be self-executing, Article 
25 completely halts the possibility. 
Neither the Paris Convention nor Article 6bis itself is self-executing. But, the 
well-known marks doctrine may still be invoked in American trademark law. This 
is because existing Lanham Act provisions impliedly work together to present a 
cause of action arising out of the doctrine. 
III. THE WELL-KNOWN MARKS DOCTRINE IS NEVERTHELESS IMPLIEDLY 
INVOKED IN THE LANHAM ACT AND DOES HAVE EFFECT UNDER THE 
DOMESTIC LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
Scholars have argued that the well-known marks doctrine actually is 
incorporated into the Lanham Act, and thus, into domestic law. Through an 
interpretation of a trinity of statutes in the Act, the well-known marks doctrine does 
in fact have a place in American law. Professor McCarthy argues that under the 
collective operation of Lanham Act § 43(a), § 44(b) and § 44(h), the well-known 
marks doctrine can and does indeed exist in American jurisprudence.165 I agree. In 
reading the Lanham Act, the Second Circuit ignored an analytical canon of 
construction.166 In cases of ambiguity, courts should interpret a statute––such as 
sections 43(a), 44(b), and 44(h) of the Lanham Act––as being consistent with 
international obligations.167 This is known as the Charming Betsy canon of 
construction. Coupled with an evaluation of legislative history, the Lanham Act can 
be read in a manner that impliedly includes the well-known marks doctrine. 
A. The Charming Betsy Canon and Legislative History 
The Supreme Court has held that acts of Congress can supersede international 
law only when such acts clearly conflict with international obligations, and Congress 
 
163. See sources cited supra note 155. 
164. Paris Convention, supra note 1, at art. 25. 
165. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:4. 
166. Id. 
167. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 123, § 109 (citing 
Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804)); see also Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 367  
F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Luigi Bormioli Corp. v. United States, 304 F.3d 1362, 1368  
(Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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passed the act after the international treaty was ratified.168 In all other situations, 
courts continue to follow the Charming Betsy canon. 
In Murray v. the Schooner Charming Betsy, the Supreme Court had to determine 
whether federal violations of jus cogens169 norms constituted a waiver of 
immunity.170 The Court determined that there was a waiver.171 Chief Justice 
Marshall based his decision on two points. First, international law created such a 
waiver. Second, Marshall recognized that the U.S. should try its best to avoid legal 
conflicts with international obligations.172 Under the Charming Betsy canon, unless 
Congress has indicated otherwise, courts should consider the doctrine of 
international comity when interpreting statutes. Specifically, this canon of 
construction recognizes that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to 
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains,”173 even when 
the international agreement requires enacting legislation. Thus, courts should aim 
to interpret applicable provisions in a manner consistent with international 
obligations. 
At least one federal court has used the Charming Betsy canon when evaluating 
provisions of the Lanham Act.174 In analyzing the usage of a surname as a trademark 
in In re Rath, the Federal Circuit used the Charming Betsy canon to review Lanham 
Act section 44(e). This section allows a foreign mark holder to register their mark if 
it is “eligible.”175 In this case, the Federal Circuit found that the canon would not 
have changed its ruling, because the mark at issue simply could not be registered.176 
Despite this ruling, the court found that “[t]here is no question but that Congress 
generally intended section 44 of the Lanham Act to implement the Paris 
Convention.”177 
Where statutory language is unclear, courts can evaluate the meaning of a 
particular provision by looking to its legislative history.178 This investigation may 
include the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the statute, the legislative 
 
168. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998). 
169. Jus cogens refers to certain fundamental, overriding principles of international law, from 
which no derogation is ever permitted. They are also known as “peremptory norms.” See IAN 
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed. 2003). 
170. See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 66–67. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 118–21. 
173. Id. at 118; see also William S. Dodge, The Charming Betsy and The Paquete Habana, in 
LANDMARK CASES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Eirik Bjorge & Cameron Miles eds., 2017) 
(providing a general analysis of the role Charming Betsy and Paquete Habana play in American 
jurisprudence). 
174. See, e.g., In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (using the Charming Betsy canon 
to review whether there is any ambiguity in Lanham Act section 44). 
175. Lanham Act § 44(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2012). 
176. In re Rath, 402 F.3d at 1211. 
177. Id. 
178. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984). 
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policy that the statute was designed to implement, and the statute’s relationship to 
existing principles governing the same general subject matter.179 
Indeed, the Federal Circuit turned to the Lanham Act’s legislative history in In 
re Rath. There, the court noted that Congress had in fact intended to invoke the 
terms of international agreements in the terms of the Lanham Act.180 Truly, the 
Lanham Act’s legislative history shows that “[t]he intent of this Act is . . . to provide 
rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, 
trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the United States and 
foreign nations.”181 Moreover, Congress instructed that “[the Lanham Act] attempts 
to accomplish these various things: . . . 2. To carry out by statute our international 
commitments . . . .”).182 So, there is a clear Congressional intent to invoke the Paris 
Convention in the terms of Lanham Act section 44. However, there is no clear 
intent that Congress would provide registration or protection for foreign marks that 
do not satisfy domestic requirements.183 
The court in Rath held that the Charming Betsy presumption is inapplicable 
where the Lanham Act does not provide for registration of a trademark.184 Indeed, 
“Congress did not simply adopt language incorporating the requirements of the 
convention in the Lanham Act. Rather it provided for registration of a foreign mark 
‘if eligible.’”185 Under the Lanham Act, “[a] mark is not ‘eligible’ for registration on 
the principal register under the statute unless it satisfies the section 2 
requirements.”186 So, as noted before, the well-known marks doctrine should only 
come into play where a mark can be registered. This may include the requirement 
that the mark has been “used” in interstate commerce. 
Thus, in the cases involving a well-known foreign mark, courts should first 
evaluate whether the mark can be registered under the statutory bars of Lanham 
Act section 2. While the terms of the Lanham Act may not in and of themselves be 
ambiguous, there is a question as to whether or not the Act as a whole impliedly 
invokes the well-known marks doctrine in its language. Because of this uncertainty, 
the Lanham Act should be read as being consistent with international obligations. 
Finally, section 45 of the Lanham Act, read using the Charming Betsy canon, 
provides an unambiguous look at Congress’s intent in implementing the Lanham 
Act. Among other aspects touched upon, this section identifies that 
[t]he intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of 
Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks 
in such commerce . . . and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties 
 
179. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728–29, 731–32, 734–37 (1975). 
180. In re Rath, 402 F.3d at 1211. 
181. Id. 
182. H.R. REP. No. 78-603, at 4 (1943). 
183. In re Rath, 402 F.3d at 1211–12. 
184. Id. at 1211. 
185. TRADEMARK LAW GUIDE ¶ 60,497. 
186. Id. 
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and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair 
competition entered into between the United States and foreign nations.187 
The language of this section clearly demonstrates that Congress intended to 
incorporate treaty provisions within the Lanham Act, and maybe even provide 
larger rights to foreign mark holders. “It has been held that those treaties, certain 
phases of them, are not self-executing; so, in the interest of clarity, as well as the 
integrity of treaty obligations, we have put the treaty provisions into our law, and 
[the Lanham Act] has that object in mind.”188 In fact, Judge Bryson’s concurrence 
in Rath seems to indicate as such. “Although the PTO’s interpretation of section 44 
in light of the Paris Convention has changed over time, the PTO has explicitly 
adopted the view that the Paris Convention gives foreign nationals rights under the 
Lanham Act that may be unavailable to United States citizens.”189 For example, 
there does not appear to be a “use in commerce” requirement for foreign marks to 
achieve registration and protection on the federal level. Because of this clear history 
and understanding, any arguments about the difference in timing between the treaty 
and the Lanham Act do not hold water. Further, there is no need to argue about 
whether “treaty” under Article 25 only refers to those with domestic effect because 
Congress clearly intended for the Lanham Act to comport with international 
obligations. 
Under Article 6quinquies, trademarks registered in a Member State may be 
denied registration or invalidated in the following circumstances: 
1. when they are of such a nature as to infringe rights acquired by third 
parties in the country where protection is claimed; 2. when they are devoid 
of any distinctive character, or consist exclusively of signs or indications 
which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended 
purpose, value, place of origin, of the goods, or the time of production, or 
have become customary in the current language or in the bona fide and 
established practices of the trade of the country where protection is 
claimed; 3. when they are contrary to morality or public order and, in 
particular, of such a nature as to deceive the public.190 
As mentioned, “use,” however does not appear to be a requirement. Indeed, 
the U.S. Senate noted this when introducing several amendments to section 44. The 
Senate illustrated that “[t]hese amendments will not affect U.S. obligations under 
the Paris Convention, as presently interpreted, because they do not preclude an 
applicant under Section 44 of the Act from obtaining a U.S. registration without 
 
187. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (emphasis added). 
188. Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 909, 
928 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (referencing in appendix Hearings on H.R. 9041 Before the Subcomm. on 
Trademarks of the House Comm. on Patents, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 195 (1938) (statement of Comm’r 
Coe)). 
189. In re Rath, 402 F.3d at 1216 (Bryson, J., concurring) (citing John B. Pegram, Trademark 
Law Revisions: Section 44, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 141, 162–70 (1988)). 
190. Paris Convention, supra note 1, at art. 6quinquies. 
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making use.”191 So, as long as a foreign holder of a mark that is well-known can 
show their mark is being affected by a mark that is “of such a nature as to infringe 
rights acquired by third parties in the country where protection is claimed,” then 
that holder has rights under the Lanham Act. 
Legislative history and the Lanham Act’s statutory text show that Congress 
intended to comport American trademark principles with the United States’ 
commitment to the Paris Convention. This adherence should include the well-
known marks doctrine under Article 6bis. Even though the doctrine is not explicitly 
presented in the Lanham Act’s language, the Charming Betsy canon counsels for a 
reading of the Act in a way that comports with international law. Moreover, the 
Congress of the United States has not indicated that it does not consider 
international conventions; quite the opposite, in fact. Thus, the Lanham Act’s 
legislative history and a reading of the Lanham Act under the Charming Betsy 
doctrine help lead to the conclusion that the well-known marks doctrine is impliedly 
invoked in the Lanham Act. 
B. The Trinity of Lanham Act Sections 43(a), 44(b), and 44(h), and How It 
Impliedly Invokes the Well-Known Marks Doctrine in American 
Trademark Law 
Under the Charming Betsy canon of construction, courts should read the 
Lanham Act in a manner that can never “be construed to violate the law of nations, 
if any other possible construction remains.”192 If courts read the Lanham Act as a 
whole in this way, the well-known marks doctrine can be impliedly invoked through 
some of its provisions. To find that the well-known marks doctrine is impliedly 
invoked in federal law, courts should evaluate that a trinity of Lanham Act 
provisions and find that, in conjunction, they provide standing and a cause of action 
for a foreign national plaintiff to sue in U.S. courts for trademark infringement of 
their well-known or famous mark. 
Lanham Act section 43(a), in conjunction with sections 44(b) and 44(h), gives 
a foreign national without a federal registration of their mark standing to sue in a 
federal court. When the foreign national plaintiff files suit against a defendant 
infringing its trademark, it may invoke the well-known marks doctrine of the Paris 
Convention Article 6bis. Simply, section 43(a) allows for the mark holder to file suit 
for infringement of its unregistered mark. Then, the foreign trademark holder can 
invoke section 44(h) because it entitles them to “effective protection against unfair 
competition.” Subsequently, section 44(b) expands that protection “to the extent 
necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention.” Actionable “unfair 
competition” therefore includes whatever is barred by “any provision” of an 
international agreement, including the Paris Convention. So a foreign trademark 
owner can sue under Section 44 of the Lanham Act for violations of Article 6bis of 
 
191. S. REP. No. 100-515, at 43 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5606. 
192. Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). 
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the Paris Convention. Then, the foreign national plaintiff should prevail if 
its mark is so well-known in the U.S. that confusion is likely. 
As noted above, Lanham Act section 43(a)(1) is the primary statutory vehicle 
for bringing a claim that an unregistered mark holder’s trademark is being infringed. 
Thus, a foreign national holder of an unregistered well-known mark would be able 
to bring a cancellation claim in federal court. Indeed, section 43(a)”is the only 
provision in the Lanham Act that protects an unregistered mark” and “[i]ts purpose 
is to prevent consumer confusion regarding a product’s source, . . . and to enable 
those that fashion a product to differentiate it from others on the market.”193 To 
prevail on a claim under this section, a plaintiff must show that their mark is 
distinctive and that it has been infringed.194 
Concurrently with section 43(a), Lanham Act section 44 provides a foreign 
national holder of a well-known mark standing to sue in federal court. 
Section 44(b) of the Lanham Act allows persons of nations with a trademark 
treaty with the United States the right to invoke Lanham Act section 44 to give 
effect to the provisions of that treaty.195 This section of the Lanham Act, Benefits of 
section to persons whose country of origin is party to convention or treaty, identifies that 
[a]ny person whose country of origin is a party to any convention or treaty 
relating to trademarks, trade or commercial names, or the repression of 
unfair competition, to which the United States is also a party, or extends 
reciprocal rights to nationals of the United States by law, shall be entitled 
to the benefits of this section under the conditions expressed herein to the 
extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty 
or reciprocal law, in addition to the rights to which any owner of a mark is 
otherwise entitled by this chapter.196 
Lanham Act section 44(h) embodies the Paris Convention principle of 
“national treatment” by granting to qualified foreign entities the same protection 
against unfair competition that is enjoyed by nationals of the U.S.197 This protection 
is the same kind of legal protection found either in the federal Lanham Act or in 
state law. Under Lanham Act section 44(h), “[a]ny person designated in subsection 
(b) of this section as entitled to the benefits and subject to the provisions of this 
Act shall be entitled to effective protection against unfair competition.”198 Further, 
“the remedies provided herein for infringement of marks shall be available so far as 
they may be appropriate in repressing acts of unfair competition.”199 In addition, 
this section “provides that if a foreign entity is entitled to the benefits of a treaty 
such as the Paris Convention, it is entitled to protection against unfair competition 
 
193. Centaur Commc’ns, Ltd., v. A/S/M Commc’ns, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217 (1987). 
194. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992). 
195. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:4. 
196. See Lanham Act § 44(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2012). 
197. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002). 
198. Lanham Act § 44(h), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(h). 
199. Id. 
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and the remedies provided by the Lanham Act.”200 In analyzing the intersection of 
sections 44(b) and 44(h), courts have held that 
[t]he grant in [Lanham Act § 44] subsection (h) of effective protection 
against unfair competition is tailored to the provisions of the unfair 
competition treaties by subsection (b), which extends the benefits of 
section 44 only to the extent necessary to give effect to the treaties. The 
federal right created by subsection 44(h) is coextensive with the substantive 
provisions of the treaty involved . . . . In this way, subsections (b) and (h) 
work together to provide federal rights and remedies implementing federal 
unfair competition treaties.201 
But in ITC, the Second Circuit did not follow this analysis. Instead, it argued 
that “Congress’s specificity in dealing with registered marks cautions against reading 
a famous marks exception into sections 44(b) and (h), which nowhere reference the 
doctrine, much less the circumstances under which it would appropriately apply 
despite the fact that the foreign mark was not used in this country.”202 Again, this 
view is wrong. Congressional history does show intent to honor the Paris 
Convention, as discussed above, for even unregistered trademarks. Moreover, 
Congress has shown an intention to provide foreign mark holders rights that even 
American citizens do not get. Thus, reading the Lanham Act using the Charming 
Betsy canon of construction leads to the conclusion that sections 43(a), 44(b), and 
44(h) work together to impliedly invoke the well-known marks doctrine. Even if 
the doctrine has not been explicitly defined, it is still part of American law. 
However, to satisfy the Second Circuit’s concerns, I would turn to recommending 
amending section 44 of the Lanham Act to include a provision specifically 
referencing the doctrine. 
IV. NEXT STEPS: AMENDING THE LANHAM ACT AND DEFINING A TEST FOR 
WELL-KNOWN TRADEMARKS 
A. Proposed Amendment to the Lanham Act 
To make the “well-known marks” doctrine clear in American law, the Lanham 
Act should be amended.203 Any amendment to the Lanham Act should appear in 
section 44, because it explicitly relates to international conventions. Amending 
section 44 would solidify the well-known marks doctrine into American trademark 
law. Further, any amendment to section 44 would reiterate the United States’ 
 
200. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:4. 
201. Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Empresa 
Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 480 (2d Cir. 2005); Mattel, 396 F.3d at 907; Havana 
Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 134 (2d Cir. 2000). 
202. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 163 (2d Cir. 2007). 
203. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29.4; see also INTA Board Backs Proposal for U.S. Statute on 
Well-Known Marks, 66 INTA BULL. 9 (2011) (The INTA Board of Directors adopted a resolution in 
support of amending U.S. law to provide an explicit basis for the well-known marks doctrine). 
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commitment to the treaties and conventions it ratifies and incorporates into the 
Supreme law of the land. 
My recommended amendment is a simple one. Congress should take section 
44(h) and add a few words. In my view, the Lanham Act, section 44(h) should be 
amended in this manner: 
Any person designated in subsection (b) of this section as entitled to the 
benefits and subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be entitled to 
effective protection against unfair competition, including the protection 
of a mark that is well-known under any treaty or convention relating 
to trademark protection which the United States is a party to, and the 
remedies provided in this chapter for infringement of marks shall be 
available so far as they may be appropriate in repressing acts of unfair 
competition. 
Moreover, if it needs to be made more explicit, then I would recommend 
creating a new subsection of section 44. This hypothetical section 44( j ) would read, 
simply: Any person designated in subsection (b) of this section holding a well-
known trademark shall be entitled to the benefits and remedies of this chapter, so 
long as the owner of the mark is otherwise entitled to these rights under this chapter. 
In my view, amending section 44(h) as described above is sufficient, but this 
potential section 44( j ) could play a role in resolving disputes regarding the existence 
of the well-known marks doctrine in domestic law. 
With these hypothetical amendments, Lanham Act section 44(h) alone would 
then explicitly reference owners of well-known marks, or the Act as a whole would 
provide rights to holders of well-known marks. This would alleviate the circuit split 
and any other legal contentions regarding the validity of the doctrine in American 
trademark law. Congress could also further define what makes a mark well-known, 
or it could leave it to the courts to decide. Of the available options and definitions 
of being “well-known,” the “secondary meaning plus” test is the most appropriate. 
B. What Makes a Mark Well-Known? 
Because the well-known marks doctrine is in fact impliedly invoked in 
domestic law, the next question is how it should be implemented. Simply, when a 
foreign national plaintiff files suit, how do they prove their mark is well-known? 
Frankly, it is difficult to pinpoint what exactly makes a mark “well known.” Indeed, 
“[t]he [Article 6 bis] meaning of ‘well-known’ (notoirement connue) is rather elusive. 
Certainly, it means something more than merely ‘known.’ ‘Notoire’ in French means 
something which is of common knowledge or a manifest thing.”204 The main 
problem is that, under U.S. law, it is unclear just how much fame is required for a 
mark to be recognized as well-known. “The Paris Convention leaves the definition 
of what is a well-known mark to the ‘competent authority’ of the nation in which 
 
204. LADAS, supra note 31, § 681. 
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protection is sought.”205 So, “the scope of protection may differ from one country 
to the other.”206 Because “[t]he scope of protection afforded to well-known marks 
is different in each country,”207 the United States must establish a concrete 
definition. 
In answering this question, the Second Circuit listed four possibilities for 
defining the level of renown that might be required. These are: (1) simple secondary 
meaning; (2) secondary meaning plus; (3) the anti-dilution standard; and (4) use of 
the six factors listed by the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”).208 
The first possibility is using a strict secondary meaning test. However, both 
the Second and Ninth Circuits noted that this test could not be utilized 
appropriately. Mere secondary meaning alone is not an appropriate standard for 
application of the famous or well-known marks doctrine because it would 
effectively eliminate the territoriality principle, which “has a long history in the 
common law.”209 
The second option––which is an expansion on the first––is referred to as 
“secondary meaning plus.” This analytical test was defined by the Ninth Circuit in 
Grupo Gigante. According to the Ninth Circuit, the secondary meaning plus test is 
that “where the mark has not before been used in the American market, the court 
must be satisfied, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a substantial percentage 
of consumers in the relevant American market is familiar with the foreign mark.”210 
McCarthy suggests that a “substantial percentage” should be at least fifty percent 
of “consumers in the relevant American market.”211 Further, the Ninth Circuit 
defined this standard as an “intermediate” one, where owners of foreign famous 
marks do not need to “show the level of recognition necessary to receive nation-
wide protection against trademark dilution.”212 But, the owner of a foreign famous 
mark “who does not use a mark in the United States must show more than the level 
of recognition that is necessary in a domestic infringement case.”213 
Third, the Second Circuit suggested a famousness evaluation through the test 
expressed in the federal anti-dilution statute. Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act 
establishes a high standard of recognition and famousness.214 Under this section, 
courts should evaluate four non-exclusive factors when determining whether a mark 




207. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:62. 
208. See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 167–70 (2d Cir. 2007) ( laying out various 
tests in request for New York Court of Appeals to answer certified questions). 
209. See id. at 167 (citing Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1097–98 
(9th Cir. 2004)). 
210. Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1098. 
211. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:4. 
212. Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1098. 
213. Id. at 1106 (Graber, J., concurring). 
214. See Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012). 
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geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or 
publicized by the owner or third parties; (2) the amount, volume, and geographic 
extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark; (3) the extent of actual 
recognition of the mark; and (4) whether the mark was registered under the Act of 
March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.215 If a 
mark holder has his or her mark deemed famous under this test, they may seek an 
injunction against another person who, “at any time after the owner’s mark has 
become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely 
to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, 
regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, 
or of actual economic injury.”216 But this test may be too specific when compared 
to claims arising under Article 6bis. This Article is merely a protection against a 
pirate who either uses or registers an owner’s well-known mark before the owner.217 
It is not a dilution enforcement tool. Moreover, protection against dilution and 
tarnishment relate to famous marks. Because of the limited scope of Article 6bis, it 
would be best to not confuse whether a mark is famous or well-known. Thus, the 
American test for dilution should not be the well-known marks test. 
Finally, the Second Circuit proposed utilizing the factors that WIPO found 
relevant in the non-binding “Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the 
Protection of Well–Known Marks,” adopted in 1999. These factors are: (1) the 
degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in the relevant sector of the public; 
(2) the duration, extent, and geographical area of any use of the mark; (3) the 
duration, extent, and geographical area of any promotion of the mark, including 
advertising or publicity and the presentation, at fairs or exhibitions, or the goods 
and/or services to which the mark applies; (4) the duration and geographical area 
of any registrations, and/or any application for registration, of the mark, to the 
extent that they reflect use or recognition of the mark; (5) the record of successful 
enforcement of rights in the mark, in particular, the extent to which the mark was 
recognized as well known by competent authorities; and (6) the value associated 
with the mark.218 
Out of these four tests, none have been exclusively picked to be the standard. 
In my view, courts should utilize the secondary meaning plus test. Because of its 
intermediate nature, it ensures that holders of foreign well-known marks may be 
able to more easily register their marks and pursue infringement claims. Likewise, it 
more easily allows American companies to ensure their well-known marks are not 
being infringed on by foreign “trolls.” 
 
215. Id. § 1125(c)(2). 
216. Id. § 1125(c)(1). 
217. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 27:3. 
218. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., JOINT RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING 
PROVISIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF WELL–KNOWN MARKS (1999), http://www.wipo.int/ 
edocs/pubdocs/en/marks/833/pub833.pdf [https://perma.cc/2P7A-FDYB]; see also FREDERICK 
MOSTERT, FAMOUS AND WELL-KNOWN MARKS: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2004). 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, I reiterate that the Paris Convention and the “well-known 
marks” doctrine under Article 6bis are not self-executing, and do not have 
immediate effect on American law or enforceability in American courts. But, this 
may not matter, because a trinity of Lanham Act provisions does indicate that 
Congress did intend to provide causes of actions for foreign parties. In order to 
emphasize this, Congress should amend the Lanham Act. If it does so, or if courts 
do find that the well-known marks doctrine is implicated in American law, this 
should allow for foreign holders of well-known marks to bring claims in American 
courts, so long as the mark has been used within American commerce and meets 
the “secondary meaning plus” test. 
There are several implications for the future depending on what happens 
across the American political system. If the Ninth Circuit––and my––view takes 
hold, then foreign companies would likely be more willing to invest in the United 
States. This is because these companies would come into the economy without fear 
that the goodwill they accumulated with their marks would go to waste. If, however, 
the Second Circuit view is held to be the dominant view, then the United States will 
continue to be hypocritical in its application of international law. 
To comport with the principles the United States agreed to when it signed the 
Paris Convention, to implement the intention of Congress when it adopted and 
amended the Lanham Act, to limit forum shopping, and to further the goals of the 
Lanham Act, the well-known marks doctrine must be invoked in American law. 
This goal can be currently reached impliedly, or explicitly through an amendment. 
Regardless of which understanding takes hold, the well-known marks doctrine 
should be recognized in U.S. law and provide foreign national well-known mark 
holders reprieve from pirates that seek to seep from the goodwill they have 
established across borders. 
 
